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INTRODUCTION

At four feet, nine inches tall, defendant Timothy Parody
appeared to one of the psychiatrists who evaluated him as "a little
boy in grown up's clothes." 2 This impression, however, extended

beyond his unusually small stature. Seventeen at the time of his
evaluation, he presented with a number of health issues and signs
that competency to stand trial or enter a plea would be an issue. 3
And while he could parrot, for example, what being on the sex
offender registry was, he seemed to lack understanding. 4 As quoted
in the opinion dissenting from the majority that affirmed the validity
of his plea and sentence, he explained, "Sir, what I am trying to do is
not get on the sex offender contract. So that way I can do what the
Lord called me to do. . . ." From this statement and other evidence, it
appears Parody likely did not understand the consequences of
pleading guilty, a conclusion supported by the conflicting expert
opinions regarding his understanding of the charges and proceedings
against him.5 He had been diagnosed with an organic brain disorder,
unspecified psychosis, seizure disorder, and it was the psychiatrist's
determination that he had an inability to care for or support
himself.6 It was determined that he was "extremely immature
functioning."7 And, while it might be possible for Parody to repeat
the names and roles of the people in the courtroom, the psychiatrist
opined that he could not "make an appropriate judgment in
reference to the proceedings against him" and that he was "unable to
comprehend the entire situation."8

2. Brown v. Parody, 751 S.E.2d 793, 797 (Ga. 2013) (Benham, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 798. (Benham, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 797 (Benham, J., dissenting) ("Many of the questions consisted of
conclusory statements, some containing legal termsof art, to which Parody was then
asked if he understood. Most of Parody's responses were simply, 'Yes, ma' am."').
5. Id. at 798. (Benham, J., dissenting).
6. Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
7. Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 797 (Benham, J., dissenting).
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At the time of his evaluation, which was prompted by the
charges brought against him, Parody had the social capacity of a
nine- or ten-year-old boy.9 He reported that he still believed in Santa
Claus and the Easter Bunny and claimed he had "magic dust" that
some children gave to him on the school bus.' 0 Although he was
enrolled at Camden County High School, he was placed in a special
education classroom under the supervision of several teachers."
On January 13, 2011, without ever having had a hearing on the
matter of his competency to stand trial or enter a guilty plea, Parody
appeared before the Brunswick Judicial Circuit Superior Court' 2
with his public defender to plead guilty but mentally ill. 13
The trial judge, in possession of the psychiatric evaluations of
the teenager who stood before her, asked Parody a series of yes or no
questions without attempting to test whether he really understood
what he was saying.1 4 As the plea court and counsel asked a number
of questions or made longer statements, often using terms of art, the
Defendant responded almost unfalteringly with merely "yes" or "yes,
ma'am."1 5
After finding that Parody understood the rights he was
voluntarily waiving and the nature of the charges, accepting the
plea, and pronouncing a sentence of thirty years with fifteen years to
be served in prison, the plea court had one more question:
THE COURT: Now, do you have anything you'd like to say to
the Court?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, not until I get out.
THE COURT: Well, I just wanted to see if you had anything
else you needed to say; okay?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

9. Id. at 798 (Benham, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 797 (Benham, J., dissenting).
11. Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
12. The Superior Court Judge who accepted his plea has since resigned from
the bench in order to resolve a Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission

investigation and has been the subject of a number of news stories expressing
concern for her judgment. Robbie Brown, "Georgia Judge Accused of Misconduct Will
Resign," N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 21, 2011, at A29 ("In November and December, the judicial
commission brought formal complaints against Judge Williams, after receiving
multiple complaints from lawyers. The commission accused her of giving special
treatment to the relatives of her friends, allowing her personal lawyer to represent
clients before her and behaving in a 'tyrannical' manner.").
13. Parody, 751 S.E.2d at 794.
14. Id. at 798 (Benham, J., dissenting).
15. See id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
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THE COURT: All right. And good luck to you; okay?
TIE DEFENDANT: But I do not like cold dinners.
THE COURT: You don't like cold dinners.' 6
That concluded his guilty plea and sentencing. A pro se habeas
petition on this case was filed alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel, specifically claiming that the "plea attorney failed to
investigate all mitigating factors in regard to [his] mental health
condition and [his] competency to stand trial," and that petition was
later granted. The State appealed and the Supreme Court of Georgia
ultimately reversed the decision of the habeas court.17 Its reasoning
was that the habeas hearing had failed to show either evidence of
innocence of the charges or that Parody would not have been found
guilty after a trial.18
The dissenting opinion differed sharply in its description of the
underlying facts and the legal standard in the case.1 9 Instead, the
Court focused on how the Parody's counsel should have requested a
competency hearing. The failure to seek a hearing impacted the
proceedings in the sense that Parody proceeded to a plea despite the
fact that there had been no searching inquiry into whether he was
capable of doing so:
[The central issue . . . is not whether there is a reasonable
probability that a less severe sentence would have been
imposed in response to Parody's guilty plea but whether the
plea would have been entered in the first place or, if entered,
would have been accepted without a trial on the issue of his
competency to enter the plea. 20
This case and others like it highlight a significant gap in our Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence: what appellate review is appropriate in
non-capital cases in which mental disability exists, but where there
has been no competency hearing?
Strickland v. Washington and Hill v. Lockhart, each in their own
time and their own way, represented forward steps in protecting
defendants from their attorneys' unreasonable error if that error

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 797 (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 797-98. (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. at 801. (Benham, J., dissenting).
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negatively impacted the outcome of their criminal proceeding. 21 No
special provisions were made in either test for the mentally ill or
mentally disabled; the tests are broadly applicable. 22
This Article addresses the questions of attorney error and client
competency and examines the following issues: the origin and
development of the legal tests for intellectual competency to stand
trial or enter a plea and the tests for evaluating Sixth Amendment
effective assistance of counsel claims; the range of state and federal
approaches to circumstances when those two situations converge;
and whether and how our legal tests should be shaped to best assess
attorney error when the client likely has an intellectual disability or
incompetence. When consideration of a defendant's mental illness or
mental disability forms the basis of a Sixth Amendment claim,
should the prejudice analysis be limited to whether, but for counsel's
unreasonable errors, a competency hearing would have been held?
These questions address not only the need for counsel's
identification of legal disability but also the need for a nuanced Sixth
Amendment analysis under the circumstances. Without a legal
finding of incompetency, a disabled prisoner can never prove
prejudice under the Strickland and Hill standards as they are now
routinely applied in many jurisdictions. 23
Our deepening understanding of mental illness-and the extent
to which mental illness and disability issues are entwined with
questions of criminal justice-demands a more precise approach
than many jurisdictions now employ. Lower courts' divergent
decisions call out for the Supreme Court to clarify this issue to.
ensure that state courts across the country properly apply the
Strickland prejudice analysis to better protect the most vulnerable
defendants in our justice system.

21. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (test for determining the validity of
a guilty plea is "whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant"); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984) (the Court has recognized "the right to the
effective assistance of counsel").
22. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
23. Id. (holding that the proper standard for attorney performance is
"reasonably effective assistance").
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I. THE HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE EXISTING
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MENTAL COMPETENCY AND
REASONABLY COMPETENT COUNSEL
The lines of cases pertaining to the right not to be tried while
incompetent and to the right to effective assistance of counsel
originated and have developed entirely independently. First of all,
the protections from court proceedings beyond the intellectual ken of
a criminal defendant have their roots in due process, 2 4 while the
Sixth Amendment forms the basis for the right to counsel and to
effective assistance of counsel. 25 The Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel is indispensable to an adversarial
system of justice that defines a fair trial as one in which an accused's
procedural rights are protected. 26
A. Findingsof Competence and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
In March of 1966, the Supreme Court announced in Pate v.
Robinson that a defendant whose competence is in doubt cannot be
deemed to have knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a
competency hearing. 27 When the competency of a defendant is
reasonably in doubt, procedural due process requires that the trial
court must provide the defendant with a hearing on the issue of
competency. 28 Second, once a defendant's competence to stand trial
24. Joe Hennell, Mental Illness on Appeal and the Right to Assist Counsel, 29 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 350, 360 (2013) ("The right to competency at trial
alone does not sufficiently protect the mentally ill from the criminal justice system.
It is improper to rely solely on trial procedures to identify competency issues because
the trial period presents a mere snapshot of the defendant's mental state.").
25. Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based
Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413,
418 (1988) ("Implicit in the general right to counsel is the right to effective assistance
of counsel. This right was originally based on a fourteenth amendment due process
analysis, which stressed the fairness of the adversarial process. However, the
Supreme Court later recognized effective assistance of counsel as a separate right
rooted in the Sixth Amendment.").
26. Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due
Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1986).
27. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
28. Id. at 385-87; See also Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 175-83 (1975) (The
Supreme Court concluded that Petitioner's due process rights would not be
adequately protected by remanding the case for a psychiatric examination to
determine whether he was in fact competent to stand trial in 1969, but the State is
free to retry him, assuming that at the time of such trial he is competent to be tried.
Even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court
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has been put in issue by information known to defendant's counsel,
the resulting proceedings are necessarily dependent upon the results
of the constitutionally required competency hearing. 29
In Pate, the State insisted that "Robinson had deliberately
waived the defense of his competence to stand trial by failing to
demand a sanity hearing as provided by Illinois law."3 0 However, the

Court held "it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be
incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to
have the court determine his capacity to stand trial."3 1 The State
court's failure in Pate to "make such inquiry into Robinson's
competency thus deprived Robinson of his constitutional right to a
fair trial."32 "The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the evidence
here was not sufficient to require a hearing in light of the mental
alertness and understanding displayed in Robinson's 'colloquies'
with the trial judge."33

Still, the Supreme Court held that "this

reasoning offers no justification for ignoring the uncontradicted
testimony of Robinson's history of pronounced irrational behavior." 34
The Court also found that "[w]hile Robinson's demeanor at trial
might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot
be relied upon to dispense with a hearing on that very issue." 3 5
Of course, lines of cases related to defendants being not guilty by
reason of insanity are somewhat different from the right not to be
tried while incompetent.3 6 The Supreme Court, in Dusky v. United
States, announced "it is not enough for the district judge to find that
'the defendant is oriented to time and place and has some
recollection of events,' but that the 'test must be whether he has

must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the
accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.).
29. David W. Beaudreau, Due Process or "Some Process'? Restoring Pate v.
Robinson's Guarantee of Adequate Competency Procedures, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 369,
381-82 (2011). ("The Court reasoned that the trial judge could not rely on his own
observation of Robinson's demeanor in court 'to dispense with a hearing' to

determine competency. Neither could the judge rely on a single psychiatric report
that failed to give an opinion regarding the ultimate issue of competency. Hence,
Robinson had been tried and convicted without adequate procedures to determine his
competency. The 'adequate procedures' guaranteed by the Constitution consisted of
the procedures needed to make a 'concurrent determination' of Robinson's
competency to stand trial.").
30. 383 U.S. at 384.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 385.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 385-86.
35. Id. at 386.
36. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
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sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him."' 3 7 The Court later expanded on this test, noting that "a person
whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to
consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not
be subjected to a trial." 38
The Court noted in Dusky that an insufficient record made
determinations of competency difficult on appellate review without a
prior competency hearing. 39 Specifically, it said:
In view of the doubts and ambiguities regarding the legal
significance of the psychiatric testimony in this case and the
resulting difficulties of retrospectively determining the
petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the District
Court for a new hearing to ascertain petitioner's present
competency to stand trial, and for a new trial if petitioner is
found competent.4 0
Years later, in Drope v. Missouri, the Supreme Court concluded
that even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of
his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances
suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet

37. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (1960). Dusky and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171 (1975), set forth the Constitution's "mental competence" standard forbidding the
trial of an individual lacking a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings
and sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding.
38. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171; see also, Justine A. Dunlap, What's Competence Got
to Do With It: The Right Not to be Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 50 OKLA. L. REV.
495, 498-99 (1997) ("An incompetent defendant may not be tried and convicted in a
criminal proceeding. This rule is grounded in common law and constitutional
principles as set out by the United States Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States.
The test enunciated in that case was whether the defendant has 'sufficient present
ability' to consult with her lawyer with a 'reasonable degree of rational
understanding' and has 'a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings' against her. The absence of either of these factors renders a defendant
incompetent and, accordingly, unavailable for trial." (quoting Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960))).
39. 362 U.S. at 402.

40.

Id.
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the standards of competence to stand trial.4 1 That opinion set forth
the Constitution's "mental competence" standard forbidding the trial
of an individual lacking a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings and sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding.
Dusky, taken together with the Supreme Court's subsequent
decisions in Pate and Drope (among others), formed the backdrop of
competency law when the Court outlined the Sixth Amendment
standards for ineffective assistance of counsel.42 However, since
1966, this procedure has not expanded to address more nuanced
understanding of mental illness and expanding court dockets; thus,
it should therefore be re-examined.
B. Strickland v. Washington and Sixth Amendment Challenges
When assessing claims about the ineffectiveness of counsel,
courts must apply the two-prong analysis provided by this Court in
Strickland v. Washington.43 The first prong of the Strickland
standard requires that counsel's performance be deficient by falling
below an "objective standard of reasonableness," while the second
prong requires that counsel's deficient performance prejudice the
defendant.44 To satisfy the prejudice requirement, a defendant must
prove that but for counsel's deficiencies there would have been a
different outcome, and both prongs of the test must be met for trial
counsel to be found constitutionally ineffective."
In Hill v. Lockhart, decided only a few months after Strickland,
this Court established the test for defendants challenging
representation during guilty pleas.46 While the first prong is

41. 420 U.S. at 175-83.
42. Elizabeth Gable & Tyler Green, Wiggins v. Smith: The Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel Standard Applied Twenty Years after Strickland, 17 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHIcs 755, 756-58 (2004). ("The Supreme Court has created a standard to protect
the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, which has been interpreted to
mean the right to effective assistance of counsel. Counsel must be an effective
advocate of the client's position and not merely someone trained as a lawyer seated
at the same table.").

43. 466 U.S. at 669.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 687; see also id. at 695 ("The governing legal standard plays a critical
role in defining the question to be asked in assessing the prejudice from counsel's
errors. When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a
reasonable doubt respecting guilt.").
46. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.
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identical to the Strickland test, 4 7 the second prong of the Hill test
requires a showing that, but for counsel's deficient representation,
there is a reasonable probability that they would have not pleaded
guilty and insisted upon going to trial.48 This determination on
whether counsel's error "prejudiced" the defendant by causing him to
plead guilty rather than go to trial depends on the likelihood that
discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his
recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, depends in
large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have
changed the outcome of a trial.
Justice Thurgood Marshall very famously warned in his dissent
in Strickland that the Court's new Sixth Amendment test would fail
to root out ineffective assistance of counsel in cases involving
vulnerable defendants. 49 And indeed, that has come to pass in many
ways. Strickland's critics are plentiful, whether related to capital or
non-capital cases. One concern is that counsel's explanation that an
error was "strategic" can cover decisions that prejudiced their client's
case. Other concerns are that the second prong of the test-related
to prejudice-can overshadow attorney error; that plays out in many
appellate courts as an inquiry into the evidence of guilt and
appellate opinions in which that concern outweighs evaluation of
attorney performance.
These basic tests still apply to the thousands of cases raising
Sixth Amendment claims since the 1980'sso, even though the
Strickland analysis has been criticized, challenged, and further
clarified.5 1
C. Changing Tests for ChangingTimes?
The fields of psychology and psychiatry-as well as our collective
understanding of mental health and mental disability-have made

47.
48.
49.

Id. at 52.
Id.
406 U.S. at 707.

50. JOHN M. BURKOFF & HOPE L. HUDSON, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL 1-3 (1994) ([Strickland claims are] "one of the most-if not the mostcommon appeal grounds asserted by convicted criminal defendants as appellants.").
51. See generally, William E. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn:
Doctrinaland PracticalUnderminingof the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 91 (1995); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon has No Clothes: The Empty
Promise of the ConstitutionalRight to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONSTIT. L.Q. 625 (1986).
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vast strides over the past thirty years. 52 Laws and policies protecting
mentally ill defendants, however, have progressed at a slower pace.
The most recent Bureau of Justice Statistics survey, conducted
in 2006, found that nearly half of inmates in the United States had
some form of mental illness, and nearly a quarter of inmates with
mental illness had served three or more prior incarcerations. 53
Statistics even suggest that the estimated number of mentally ill
individuals in our justice system quadrupled from 2000 to 2006.54
Recent news articles from 2014 report that number of incarcerated
mentally ill individuals has increased to 60 percent.5 5 This evolution
and the pervasive mental health issues in prisons demands a more
nuanced Sixth Amendment analysis for individuals who potentially
qualify as incompetent defendants.
The Supreme Court's case law addressing mental illness and
competency has continued to evolve since Strickland and Hill were
first decided. For example, in 1985, the Supreme Court held that
indigent criminal defendants have a right to an independent
competency evaluation.56 Later, in 1996, the Court clarified that that
the proper burden of proof in such cases is preponderance of
evidence because a clear and convincing evidence standard violated
due process. 5 7 Executing the mentally ill was held to be
unconstitutional in 200258; and in 2008, the Court held that judges
may account for "mental capacities by asking whether a defendant
who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent
to do so . . . ."59

and

And yet, these two lines of cases-Sixth Amendment challenges
competency evaluations-have not yet found a way to

52. Lori A. Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for
Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 487, 493 (2004) ("Mental illness is highly
prevalent among prison inmates. The rate of mental illness among prison inmates is
three times higher than the general population.") (footnote omitted); see Joanmarie I.
Davoli, Physically Present, Yet Mentally Absent, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 313, 31819 (2009).
53. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SPECIAL
REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES. 1-2, 8 (2006).
54. U.S.: Number of Mentally Ill in Prisons Quadrupled:PrisonsIll Equipped to
Cope, Human Rights Watch (Sept. 6, 2006), http:// www.hrw.org/news/2006/09/05/usnumber-mentally-ill-prisons-quadrupled.
55. Nicholas Kristof, "Inside a Mental Hospital Called Jail," N.Y. TIMES, Feb 8,
2014.
56. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
57. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
58. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
59. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177-78 (2008) (noting that capacity to
stand trial is not equivalent to the capacity to represent oneself).
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meaningfully intertwine.6 0 Several different approaches have
emerged in the state and federal courts across the country, but the
Supreme Court has not yet taken up a case that specifically
addresses whether and how the Strickland standard should be
tailored to circumstances where a defense attorney has
unreasonably not sought a hearing on her client's competency. 6 1
II. SOME STATE APPELLATE COURTS OFFER NUANCED APPROACHES TO
THIS ISSUE, WHILE OTHER APPELLATE OPINIONS HIGHLIGHT THE NEED
FOR NEW POLICIES OR DIRECTION FROM THE SUPREME COURT.

The circumstance of mentally ill and mentally disabled
defendants pleading guilty to criminal charges is by no means
unique. 62 And the specific issue addressed by this Article-the
proper prejudice standard for an arguably incompetent defendant
whose counsel did not request a competency hearing-has percolated
into state and federal appellate courts.
Many states, while not requiring an explicit finding of
incompetence, still require a showing that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different "but for" counsel's
unreasonable errors. The question, of course, is what a jurisdiction
considers as the "proceedings" and what is considered "prejudice." In
some states, this is interpreted to mean that the defendant would
have otherwise been found to be incompetent to stand trial; in these
states, the "proceedings" refers to the competency hearing. In other
states, as in the Georgia case highlighted herein, this is interpreted
to mean that the defendant would not have been found guilty of the
underlying charges. 63
A few different formulations for the prejudice analysis have
emerged among jurisdictions that have specifically considered the
issue. Among the various approaches of these courts, one
commonality is that counsel's failure to move for a competency

60. See Beaudreau, supra note 29, at 377.
61. Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v.
Washington and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77,
83-84 (2007) ("The debilitation ambiguity of an objective standard of reasonableness
in this context is illustrated by the majority's failure to address important issues
concerning the quality of representation mandated by the Constitution ... It is also a
fact that the quality of representation available to ordinary defendants in different
parts of the country varies significantly. Should the standard of performance
mandated by the Sixth Amendment vary by locale? The majority offers no clues as to
the proper responses to these questions.") (footnote omitted).
62. See Rigg, supra note 61, at 80.

63.

Parody, 751 S.E.2d 793, 795.
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hearing potentially meets at least one of the prongs for ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland: it must have been
unreasonable. 6 4 Some jurisdictions, however, have more carefully
addressed the issue of competency by tailoring prejudice prong of the
Sixth Amendment analysis to the unique circumstances of a
defendant's incompetence.
A. Several JurisdictionsRequire a PotentiallyMentallyIncompetent
Defendant to Show Incompetence on the Record in Order to Establish
Prejudiceunder Strickland.
Several jurisdictions require that the defendant make a showing
of incompetence on the record in order to establish prejudice.6 5 For
example, a Texas court's analysis in Exparte LaHood exposes errors
that many state courts make while grappling with this
constitutional issue and the confusion around proper remedial
action. 66 The LaHood court found ample evidence that counsel
performed deficiently by failing to request a competency exam;
however, because it relied on the current record to support a finding
of incompetence, the court found that counsel's error was not
prejudicial.67 This retroactive justification of competence appears to
be an incorrect application of Strickland because the Texas court
was able to discern that counsel performed deficiently by not
requesting a competency hearing, but nonetheless still found the
defendant was not prejudiced (despite the incomplete record)6 8 . Even
more startling, the Texas court stated the accused's constitutional
right to a competency hearing was not a factor in that court's
analysis of prejudice. 69

64. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
65. See State v. Dunkin, 807 N.W.2d 744, 756 (Neb. 2012) ("In order to
demonstrate prejudice from counsel's failure to investigate competency and for
failing to seek a competency hearing, the defendant must demonstrate that there is a
reasonable probability that he or she was, in fact, incompetent and that the trial
court would have found him or her incompetent had a competency hearing been
conducted. The issue of prejudice in this case is necessarily bound up in the law of
competency."); State v. Southerland, No. 06AP-11, 2007 WL 259249, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jan. 30, 2007) ("[Alpplying the foregoing standards, we must determine
whether, on the record before us, counsel made an error in failing to request a
competency hearing and whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for this
error, the result of the trial would have been different; that is, whether appellant
would likely have been found to be incompetent to stand trial.").
66. See Ex parte LaHood, 401 S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
67. 401 S.W.3d at 54.
68. Id. at 57.

69.

Id. at 53.
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Even when acknowledging deficiencies in the record, under this
test, effective assistance of counsel can still be found by reviewing
courts. 70 Several federal circuit courts have also considered this

issue and have required a finding of incompetence on the record to
establish prejudice. The policy underlying a finding of incompetency
on the record is to ensure that criminal defendants receive adequate
procedure, which includes the opportunity to present evidence and
cross examine witnesses.7 1 For instance, in Hull v. Kyler, the
defendant had already been declared incompetent and several
medical evaluations indicated that he remained incompetent, but his
counsel failed to cross examine the only witness in his second
competency hearing. 72 The Third Circuit utilized the robust record in
this case to find that counsel's decisions caused a manifest prejudice
to plaintiff that violated the policy enumerated above. 73 Yet,
prejudice remains problematic when the record is not as robust or
clear. 74
This is evident because many cases considering this prejudice
inquiry-based solely on an appellate record that is made without
the requisite competency hearing transcript-do not find the
prejudice prong satisfied because there was insufficient evidence of a
different outcome, i.e., insufficient evidence that the defendant was
incompetent.7 5 The concern with this approach is that there can

70.

Manuel v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1159, 1160-61 (Ind. 1989) ("Manuel asserts

that in light of his limited ability to communicate and unusual behavior at the time
of the offense and the trial itself, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a
competency hearing. It is impossible to discern from the record whether Manuel was
truly unable to verbalize. At trial, Manuel communicated by nodding and shaking his
head to indicate affirmative and negative answers. Several times he stated, 'I don't
know' or 'no.' He sometimes wrote answers, albeit not in complete sentences... . The
record further establishes that Manuel had a car, license, gun and narcotics having a
substantial value. This evidence bears on his competency and counsel's failure to
raise the issue. Manuel fails to rebut the presumption that counsel rendered adequate
legal representation.") (emphasis added).
71. Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 111 (3d Cir. 1999).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 111-12; see Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1997).
74. See Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 1987) (the court relied on
defendant's closing statement and testimony to demonstrate his full understanding
of proceedings against him); Matheney v. Anderson, 377 F.3d 740, 747-49 (7th Cir.
2004) (the record showed conflicting statements regarding defendant's mental
illness, but the court did not find prejudice); Futch v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1483, 1487
(11th Cir. 1989) (remanded to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing as
petitioner alleged that counsel failed to obtain a psychological evaluation in
existence).
75. See State v. Baker, 837 N.W.2d 91, 97-98 (Neb. 2013); People v. Jenks, 69
A.D.3d 1120, 1121 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); McReynolds v. State, No. C7-01-348, 2001
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obviously be no finding of incompetence on the record if an attorney
does not move to have the issue decided in a competency proceeding
and captured on the record for review in the first place.
In many cases where the record did not show that the defendant
was incompetent or had the disposition to be held incompetent, the
second prong of the Strickland test failed.76 The same is true in
cases where counsel may have been aware of the defendant's
incompetence, but for a reason unknown, chose not to build the
record showing possible incompetence on part of the defendant.7 7
Counsel's discretion in trial strategy helps to shield counsel from
ineffective assistance claims later.78
B. Several JurisdictionsPresume Prejudice Where A Potentially
Incompetent Defendant Never Received A Hearing On The Matter Of
Her Competency To Stand Trial Or Enter A GuiltyPlea.
There are two related approaches, however, that appear suited to
the unique issues raised by the intersection of Strickland and
Drope/Dusky claims. These employ realistic expectations of what
may be shown on the record of a case that has not included a
competency hearing and tailors the relief to the error itself. There
are two subgroups of jurisdictions with this approach: one presumes
prejudice if a competency hearing was not held, and one looks to the
request (or lack thereof) of a competency hearing as the "outcome"
relevant to the "proceedings." However, each addresses the

WL 856397 at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Villeneuve, No. 183498, 1996 WL
33348847, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) ("There is nothing in the record, other than
some passing references to his possible memory loss, to show that defendant was less
than reasonably competent. Counsel reserved his right to request a competency
hearing and declined to ask for one. Because counsel refrained from requesting such
a hearing, there was probably no basis for seeking one.").
76. See Ridgley v. State, 227 P.3d 925, 931-32 (Idaho 2010) (noting the record
did not include anything suggesting that an evaluation at the time would have
shown incompetency as defendant only provided his own affidavit and an evaluation
performed nine months after the plea was entered).
77. See Dillon v. State, 75 So.3d 1045, 1051-52 (Miss. App. 2010) (burden
placed on district court to determine whether a competency hearing should have
been conducted).
78. See Kelley v. State, 277 P.3d 447, 2012 WL 1970058, at *2-3 (Kan. Ct. App.
2012) (failure to request second competency hearing was not ineffective assistance of
counsel as evidentiary hearing showed depth of defendant's understanding; Brewer
v. State, 1987 WL 11113 at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (the court upheld counsel's
determination not to hold a hearing despite conflicting medical reports regarding
competency).
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particular challenges related to the important and fact-specific
analysis required in competency hearings. 79
Some jurisdictions grant relief where, but for counsel's
unreasonable errors, a competency hearing would have been held.
While Florida courts require a likelihood of a finding of
incompetency, the state's appellate courts do not require a definitive
showing of incompetency before finding a Sixth Amendment
violation.8 0 In Coker v. State, the prejudice prong was satisfied
because the defendant provided evidence at his habeas hearing
through doctor's testimony that, in his opinion, the defendant could
have been found incompetent. 81
Several other jurisdictions, however, presume prejudice where a
defendant has not received a competency hearing. There is a
precedent for presuming prejudice in some cases of ineffective
assistance of counsel or in cases of a conflict of interest. 82 A complete
breakdown of the adversarial process warrants a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel without a finding of prejudice. 83 As
the Supreme Court has noted, "if counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has
been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary
process itself presumptively unreliable." 84 Though this standard is
rarely applied and somewhat disfavored (though not overruled), it is
analogous to cases where the Strickland and Hill tests for prejudice
simply do not fit the facts-cases in which a competency hearing
would have been appropriate but was never pursued.8 5

79.

Norma Schrock, Defense Counsel's Role in Determining Competency to

Stand Trial, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 639, 640 (1990).
80. See, e.g., Coker v. State, 978 So.2d 809, 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)
(remanding for competency hearing due to finding: (1) deficient performance because
counsel had notice of competency issue and (2) prejudice because defendant could
have been adjudicated incompetent if a competency hearing had been held).
81. Id.; see also State v. Kayhart, 2008 WL 5194447, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008) (explaining that "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, does
not require proof that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. Rather, as [the
court] reasoned, the inquiry must be whether, at the time of trial, there was
sufficient objective evidence of mental disorder to place defense counsel on notice
that a competency evaluation was warranted.").
82. See State v. Balsewicz, 2000 WL 665689, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000)
(counsel's deficiency was prejudicial because it denied defendant a hearing to which
he was constitutionally entitled).
83. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).

84.

Id.

85. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 466 U.S. 335, 356-57 (1980) (Likewise, where
the defendant can show a conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed.).
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In Indiana, counsel has also been found constitutionally
ineffective when the court adopted Strickland to the specific issue of
a competency hearing.8 6 First, the court found that counsel had been
put on notice that competency was issue.87 In analyzing deficient
performance, the court found:
In this case, one report stated that Mast was not competent
to stand trial and the other report could not make a
determination one way or another. Ultimately, it was the
responsibility of the trial counsel to ensure that the
psychiatrists' reports were given to the court and a
competency hearing was requested. Mast's trial counsel
testified at the post-conviction hearing that he hesitated
about Mast's competency but nevertheless, proceeded with a
guilty plea without awaiting the results of the psychiatrists.8 8
This objectively unreasonable attorney conduct constituted deficient
performance, and while the Indiana court also found counsel's errors
prejudiced the defendant, Indiana uses a hybrid standard heremeshing the competency hearing requirement with the reasonable
probability of a different outcome standard.89
The Wisconsin approach employs rationale and engagement with
both Due Process and Right to Counsel cases absent from many
state court opinions.9 0 When counsel in State v. Balsewicz
unreasonably failed to request a competency hearing, though the
defendant's potential incompetency issues were known to counsel,
the defendant was denied a hearing to which he was constitutionally
entitled in order to assess his competency to enter a plea. 9 1 The
"outcome," therefore, was the denial of a due process right-certainly
prejudicial to the defendant.
As a result, the court ultimately held that "counsel was deficient
for failing to object to the trial court's finding, and counsel's
deficiency was prejudicial because it, in combination with the trial
court's action, resulted in denying Balsewicz the hearing to which he
was entitled." 92 The "outcome," therefore was the denial of a due
process right-certainly prejudicial to the defendant.

86.

Mast v. State, 914 N.E.2d 851, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

87. Id.
88.

Id. at 857.

89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Lahood, 401 S.W.3d 45.
91. State v. Balsewicz, 2000 WL 665689, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. May 23, 2000).
92. Id.
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Though this survey is by no means inclusive of every state and
federal case raising potential ineffectiveness claims for counsel's
failure to request a competency hearing, appellate decisions from a
number of jurisdictions demonstrate a number of disturbing trends.
III. A MULTI-LAYERED PROBLEM: DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In the intervening thirty years since the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Strickland, our collective understanding of
mental illness and mental disability has deepened. 9 3 So too has our
information related to the number of criminal defendants whose
charges are related to their disability, 94 and who nevertheless
compose a disproportionately high percentage of the United States
prison population. 95 It therefore presents a constitutional difficulty
when the legal tests represent thinking that is outdated at best and
inapplicable at worst. A defendant who is likely mentally
incompetent
can hardly be expected to prove his own
incompetence. 9 6 This is especially problematic where that same
defendant must prove his own incompetence and his attorney's
ineffectiveness. That is, however, what the law requires in the State
of Georgia and in other jurisdictions.9 7
International law on this issue has also evolved somewhat, albeit
at a more rapid pace. As Michael Perlin points out:
Although there were prior cases decided in the United States
and in Europe that, retrospectively, had been litigated from a
human rights perspective, the characterization of disability
rights-especially the rights of persons with mental

93. See, e.g., Debra Denno, The Myth of the Double Edged Sword: An Empirical
Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493 (2015).
94. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, Forward: The Brain Sciences and Criminal Law
Norms, 62 MERCER L. REV. 705 (2011) ("Bringing [brain sciences] data into the
discussion will require us to take into account more fully than we do now the
limitations that many among us are condemned to suffer. This addition to our
conversation should conduce to greater compassion in criminal law, which is, and
will always be, good for us as a polity.").
95.

See TERRY A. KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS

BEHIND BARS AND WHAT WE MUST Do ABOUT IT (1999).
96. Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due
Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259, 1288 (1986).
97. See, e.g, Brown v. Parody, 751 S.E.2d 793.
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disabilities-was not discussed in a global public, political, or
legal debate until the early 1990s. 9 8
Since mental health issues arrived on the world's stage, one of
the more important global developments has been the 2009
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Mental Disabilities (CRPD).99 Commentators still
regard this convention "as having finally empowered the 'world's
largest minority' to claim their rights, and to participate in
international and national affairs on an equal basis with others who
have achieved specific treaty recognition and protection." 0 0
As the Supreme Court noted in Roper v. Simmons, which found
the execution of juveniles unconstitutional, it was proper to
"acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion
against the juvenile death penalty, resting in large part on the
understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young
people may often be a factor in the crime." 101 The Court recognized
that "[t]he opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our
own conclusions." 10 2 With this in mind, it is apparent that the
foreign and domestic understanding and legal treatment of mental
illness and competency have drastically evolved over the last three
law standards have now
decades, and because international
of modernunderstandings
medical
incorporated the nuances and
day mental health, it may be instructive to the United States.
As they now stand, most legal tests employed by appellate courts
examining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel related -to
mentally
is
defendant
a
criminal
where
circumstances
a
"lose-lose"
incompetent-create
arguably
incompetent-or
situation for those defendants.

98. Michael L. Perlin, A Change Is Gonna Come: The Implicationsof the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for the Domestic
Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 483
(2009).

99. U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 76th plen. mtg. at 2-4, U.N. Doc. AIRES/61/PV.106
(Jan. 24, 2007).
100. Perlin, supra note 98, at 489-90 (footnotes omitted); see also Michael L.
Perlin, "Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun: The InternationalHuman Rights
and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile Punishment Schemes," 46
Tex. Tech L. Rev. 301, 306 (2013); Michael L. Perlin & Valerie McClain, "Where
Souls Are Forgotten: CulturalCompetencies, Forensic Evaluations, and International
Human Rights," 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 257, 270-71 (2009).

101.
102.

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
Id.
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In many states and federal circuits, courts interpret Strickland's
examination of counsel's performance and its impact on the "outcome
of the [proceedings]"10 3 to address the outcome of a plea or trial on
matters of guilt or innocence. 104 The matter, as illustrated by a
number of cases described herein, however, has no bearing on
matters of guilt or innocence: if a defendant is not competent to
stand trial or enter a plea, the law provides for him an entirely
different process and remedy.
Even tests that focus on whether a defendant is actually
competent are ill-fit for the Strickland standard as now applied by
most states and federal appellate courts. By applying a prejudice
analysis that requires a potentially incompetent defendant to make
a showing of incompetence on the record, appellate courts must,
years later, make competency determinations based on an
incomplete record created by counsel's failure to request a
competency hearing. If no record was made, it is highly unlikely that
prejudice can be found from the existing record.10 5 Unless the
jurisdiction considers that a defendant has been harmed by the lack
of a competency hearing itself, an appeal will naturally fail the
Strickland test.
Take, again, the example of Timothy Parody. Although she
testified that her meetings with Parody were brief and infrequent,
plea counsel had seen her client enough to perceive significant
concerning factors related to his competence and vulnerability:
numerous
physical
disabilities;
delusions
about
mythical
creatures; 0 6 delusions about his own intellectual capacity; 0 7
extreme social immaturity;1 0 8 and, most importantly, and in her own
words, "that he sounded like he knew what he was talking about but
may not in fact be able to."109 Plea counsel for Mr. Parody had a duty
to investigate his issues of competency of which she was aware and
to request a competency hearing in order to advocate effectively on

.

103. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
104. Parody, 751 S.E.2d at 795.
105. 446 U.S. at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I agree that counsel must be
afforded "wide latitude" when making "tactical decisions" regarding trial strategy. .
but many aspects of the job of a criminal defense attorney are more amenable to
judicial oversight").
106. Id. at 797 (Benham, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 796.
108. Id. at 797 (Benham, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
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his behalf. But because she did not request a hearing, the record on
appeal was too incomplete for a grant of state habeas to stand. 110
The dissenting opinion in Parody highlights both the majority's
error and the limitations, under these circumstances, of reliance on
Strickland and Hill. With regard to deficient performance, the
dissenting opinion correctly found that the contradictions between
Parody's three mental health evaluations "raise a flag that would
have led a reasonable attorney to further investigate all mitigating
factors relating to Parody's mental competency, to question the
validity of Dr. Katzenmeyer's conclusions, and not to rely on that
report as the final authority[.]""'l Alternatively, "at the very least, a
reasonable attorney would have argued this conflicting evidence to
the judge for her consideration on the issue of Parody's mental
competency to enter a plea." 112
With regard to prejudice, the dissenting opinion in Parody
framed the issue as "whether the plea would have been entered in
the first place or, if entered, would have been accepted without a
trial on the issue of his competency to enter the plea."1 13 Plea
counsel had suspicions about Parody's competency and had gathered
conflicting mental health evaluations; yet, plea counsel failed to read
them completely, credit the findings favorable to her client,
investigate further, or request a competency hearing that Parody
was entitled to under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-130:114
The outcome that would likely have been different in this
case is the conviction upon the acceptance of a guilty plea.
The majority's conclusion that no better outcome could have
been obtained ignores the fact that Parody has been
convicted based upon a plea that was accepted without a
legally sufficient hearing to determine mental competency to
make the plea.1 15

110. Id. at 799 (Benham, J., dissenting); see also LaHood, 401 S.W.3d at 52;
Mast, 914 N.E.2d at 857; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 759 (1970); Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 (2010); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 512 (2003).
111. Parody, 751 S.E.2d at 799 (Benham, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Benham, J., dissenting); see Martin v. Barrett, 619 S.E.2d 656, 658 (Ga.
2005) (affirming the habeas court's finding that counsel's failure to investigate the
defendant's mental competence was constitutionally deficient because it was the
result of inattention and not reasoned strategy).
113. Parody, 751 S.E.2d at 801 (Benham, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 802 (Benham, J., dissenting).
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This illustrative case-involving appointed counsel who was not
aware of a psychiatric evaluation finding her client to be
incompetent and a trial court who allowed a mentally impaired
teenager to enter a plea to a lengthy term of years without fully
inquiring into his understanding of the proceedings-represents an
appalling failure of the legal system. Tailoring the Strickland
analysis to better address competency concerns will clarify existing
discrepancy in the consideration of Sixth Amendment claims. But it
will also serve another good by protecting one of our system's most
vulnerable: an indigent teenager, a "little boy in grown up's clothes"
who still believed in the Easter Bunny, and who, though facing
serious charges, lacked the capacity to "make an appropriate
judgment" or "understand the consequences" of the proceedings
against him. 1 16
If the right to a competency hearing means anything, then
failure to request one when counsel has been put on notice of a
potential mental illness or disability must be examined as a
"proceeding" with a prejudiced "outcome" under the Strickland
analysis.
IV. PROPOSED JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
There may be a number of ways to address systemic failures
through adequately funding indigent defense and training 1 7 and
support for public defenders through studies and reduced
caseloads.11 8 These legislative or administrative solutions could be
implemented immediately, and there are a number of factors
justifying such changes beyond the predicament described in this
Article.
In addition, there are a number of potential judicial solutions
that may help clarify the appropriate analysis of the "harm" explored
here. First, the Supreme Court should accept a case examining
Strickland in the context of an arguably-incompetent defendant and

116. Id. at 797, 800 (Benham, J., dissenting).
117. See ABA Defense Function Standard S. 4-3.1(a) (2015); see also Mary Sue
Bacjus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57
HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2016); Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptionsfor Ethical Blindness:
Improving Advocacy for Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L.REV.
333 (2013); Adele Bernhard, Raising the Bar: Standards-Based Training,
Supervision, and Evaluation, 75 Mo. L. REV. 831 (2010).
118. Jennifer Laurin, Data and Accountability in Indigent Defense, 14 OmIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 373 (2017); Debra Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869 (2009).
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announce that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires
careful representation with respect to mental illness and disability.
The weight of authority remains fixed in requiring the defendant to
make a definitive showing of incompetence on the record. The more
appropriate Strickland analysis, however, is taken by those
jurisdictions that presume prejudice in the absence of a competency
hearing or announce that the failure to request such a hearing is
itself a showing that the defendant has been prejudiced.
Alternatively (or additionally), adjustments should be made to
the role of busy trial courts hearing thousands of cases per yearand the fact that those courts are the proper vessels of authority
related to competency. Finally, courts can and should look to the
precedent set by Padilla v. Kentucky in the different but analogous
situation of immigration consequences. There, the Supreme Court
took note of changes in court procedures, the identity of defendants
appearing in criminal courtrooms, and remedies for attorney
performance that is ineffective under the circumstances. 119
A. The Supreme Court Should Announce the Specific Process Related
to DeterminingPrejudice Under Strickland in the Case of an
Arguably Mentally Ill or Incompetent Defendant
There is a way to incorporate legal issues of incompetency into
the well-established Strickland analysis. 120 There are a number of
national models discussed supra, but the Wisconsin example is
perhaps the most compelling. For several reasons, the approach
employed by the Wisconsin court in Balsewicz is more appropriately
tailored to the legal concerns of prejudice that result from counsel's
deficiencies in failing to request a competency hearing. 121
In Balsewicz, the defendant alleged his counsel had been
ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing. 122 While the
trial court ordered a competency evaluation and properly asked
counsel on the record whether the defense challenged the
evaluation's findings, it committed reversible error by ultimately
finding the defendant competent without conducting the required
competency hearing. 123 The appellate court also explained that the
trial court's colloquies with the defendant, which the state alleged

119.
120.

See Padilla, 559 U.S. 356.
See Balsewicz, 2000 WL 665689.

121.
122.
123.

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *4.
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demonstrated that the defendant was in fact competent, were not a
sufficient substitute for a competency hearing. 124 As a result, the
court ultimately held that "counsel was deficient for failing to object
to the trial court's finding, and counsel's deficiency was prejudicial
because it, in combination with the trial court's action, resulted in
denying Balsewicz the hearing to which he was entitled. .. ."125
For several reasons, this approach-articulated by Wisconsin-is
more appropriately tailored to the legal concerns of prejudice that
result from counsel's deficiencies in failing to request a competency
hearing. In fact, when the Supreme Court first decided Strickland
and Hill, there was relatively little case law addressing competency,
but the law that was in existence supports analysis akin to the
Wisconsin standard.
The first case, Dusky v. United States, outlined the court's test
for legal capacity, which focused on "whether [a defendant] has
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether [a
defendant] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him."126 The Court noted in Dusky that an
insufficient record made determinations of competency difficult on
appellate review without a prior competency hearing. 127 Specifically,
it said:
In view of the doubts and ambiguities regarding the legal
significance of the psychiatric testimony in this case and the
resulting difficulties of retrospectively determining the
petitioner's competency as of more than a year ago, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the District
Court for a new hearing to ascertain petitioner's present
competency to stand trial, and for a new trial if petitioner is
found competent. 128

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
362 U.S. at 402.
Id.
Id. at 403.
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B. Responsibility for DeterminingCompetency Should Not Rest
Solely With the Trial Judge, but Also With the Defense Counsel, and
the Legal Tests for ChallengingAttorney PerformanceShould Better
Suit the Factualand Legal Circumstancesof This Issue
Trial judges are no longer in a position to be the only
gatekeepers related to a defendant's competency; court dockets are
far too heavy to continue to rely solely on the rules of Dusky v.
United States and Pate v. Robinson. Trial counsel, rather, is in the
best position to identify signs and behaviors that should properly
trigger a competency hearing. Because the current method of
evaluating Sixth Amendment claims limits consideration of
prejudice to the outcome-a plea or a guilty verdict-the existing
tests are insufficient to protect the vulnerable from inept counsel
when mental illness demands an intervening competency evaluation.
A plea colloquy is by nature insufficient to establish competence
due to the subject matter of the proceeding, regardless of whether a
defendant is capable of parroting yes or no responses to the trial
court's questions. Even without concerns specific to a particular trial
court's questions and ability to recognize competence, the burden to
identify mental illness or mental incompetence should no longer rest
primarily with the judge conducting a brief plea colloquy or motion
hearing.
There is some precedent for extending counsel's scope of
responsibilities under the Sixth Amendment to include areas in
which there has been dramatic development and increased
awareness of vulnerability. For example, under the Supreme Court's
decision in Padillav. Kentucky, 129 counsel now carries the obligation
to advise non-citizen clients about the deportation risks associated
with entering a guilty plea. In doing so, the Court gave great weight
to the sweeping changes in both federal immigration law and social
policy throughout the past decades, noting that the "landscape of
federal immigration law has changed dramatically." 130 It also
accorded evolving professional norms that urged competent advice
3
around immigration consequences.1 1
Because changes in immigration law have "dramatically raised
the stakes" related to a non-citizen's criminal conviction, the Sixth
Amendment mandates that a non-citizen defendant be informed by
his counsel-not just the trial court-about the deportation risks

129.
130.
131.

559 U.S. 356, 356 (2010).
Id. at 360.
Id. at 367.
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associated with a guilty plea. 132 Failure to adequately learn about
and explain immigration consequences to a non-citizen defendant is
grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction. And this change in
application of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel has required attorneys nationwide to become familiar with
policies and procedures that protect their non-citizen clients.
The dramatic change in social policy and legislation related to
mental illness and competency is indistinguishable from the
sweeping changes in immigration law so closely regarded in Padilla;
there have always been professional norms to counsel effectively, but
counsel for mentally disabled clients should be held to a carefuland carefully-tailored-Sixth Amendment standard. Similar to
changes required by the Padilla decision, counsel representing
mentally ill or disabled clients should receive training not only in
how to detect but how to effectively counsel their clients with these
issues. And failure to adequately counsel their clients-including
seeking competency evaluations and hearings-should always be
grounds for reversal of a criminal conviction.
CONCLUSION

In sum, a review of cases from jurisdictions that have considered
this issue reveal that the Strickland analysis is awkward in the
context of analyzing attorney competence in the area of client
competence. Potentially incompetent defendants alleging that
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
request a competency hearing will not succeed under the current
standards, and judges are ill-suited to the gate-keeper role
historically reserved for them.
Without a competency hearing, plea or trial records will never be
sufficient-under the existing tests-for appellate courts to address
Sixth Amendment prejudice. Whether appellate courts adjust the
relevant prejudice standards or the responsibility of trial counsel to
seek competency evaluations, changes must be made in order to
protect our judicial process and those defendants subject to it.
Now, thirty years after Strickland, it is time to extend and
clarify this line of precedent within the context of the right to
competency hearings. This is necessary in order to ensure that the
requirement of effective assistance of counsel is met for individuals
with disabilities and outlining the proper prejudice analysis where
an allegedly incompetent defendant claims ineffective assistance of

132.

Id. at 356-57.
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counsel for failure to request a competency hearing. Without this
sort of clarity, American courts will continue to fail individuals with
mental illness or disability.

